Abstract-We consider a setup in which the channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than the channel from Eve to Bob. We show that there exist encoding and decoding which accomplish error correction and authentication simultaneously; that is, Bob is able to correctly decode a message coming from Alice and reject a message coming from Eve with high probability. The system does not require any secret key shared between Alice and Bob, provides information theoretic security, and can safely be composed with other protocols in an arbitrary context.
I. INTRODUCTION
Message authentication allows the receiver to verify that the message comes from the legitimate sender and not from an adversary. Along with secrecy, authentication is one of the most fundamental properties in cryptography. It has direct real world applications, for example in ensuring that the order for a financial transaction comes from somebody authorized to perform the transaction, and not a criminal. Authentication is also used as a primitive in many other cryptographic protocols, for example key exchange protocols, where it serves to protect against man-in-the-middle and impersonation attacks.
When defining and proving the security of an authentication scheme, we distinguish between computational and unconditional security. In the first case, the definition and proof rely on the assumption that the adversary has limited computational resources, and often also on the conjecture that a certain problem cannot be solved within the specified resource bound. On the other hand, unconditional security makes no assumption on the computational resources available to an adversary; the scheme is guaranteed to be secure against adversaries with unbounded resources.
Another important aspect of the definition of security is whether it provides composability guarantees or not. It is known that certain definitions of security, although intuitively appealing, fail to guarantee that a cryptographic scheme remains secure in an arbitrary context. One of the known examples is a criterion based on the accessible information used in early security proofs for Quantum Key Distribution. Reference [9] shows that it is possible for a protocol to satisfy this security criterion, but nevertheless the resulting key cannot be used for one-time pad encryption of a message whose header is known to the adversary. Examples such as this one motivate the introduction of frameworks for composable security such as [5] , [2] , [14] ; protocols proven secure in such a framework are guaranteed to compose safely with other protocols in the framework, and to remain secure in an arbitrary context.
In this paper, we consider the strongest possible type of message authentication: we focus on composable, unconditionally secure schemes. It is known that for message authentication to work, Alice and Bob need to have some initial advantage over their adversary Eve; otherwise, Eve can impersonate Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice. What can the initial advantage be?
Previous research on authentication in information theoretic cryptography has focused on the scenario in which Alice and Bob share randomness that is secret from their adversary Eve. Information theoretically secure authentication can be achieved using universal 2 classes of hash functions [32] : Alice and Bob share a secret key k that encodes a particular function h k from a suitable class of hash functions. To send message m to Bob, Alice computes the tag t = h k (m) and sends (m, t). To verify that (m, t) comes from Alice, Bob checks that t = h k (m). Research on this scenario has focused on finding suitable classes of functions for authentication and on proving lower bounds on the secret key size needed for a given level of security; see, for example, [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] , [20] . A variant of the basic scheme for authentication by universal hashing involves recycling part of the key when authenticating multiple messages; this was proposed in [32, Section 4] . Recently, the composable security of authentication by universal hashing both with and without key recycling has been established [23] .
A strong motivation for exploring different possibilities to obtain a composable, unconditionally secure authenticated channel comes from the study of information-theoretically secure key distribution protocols in classical [19] , [1] and quantum [4] , [8] cryptography. These key distribution protocols require interaction between the honest participants over an authenticated channel. If Alice and Bob need an initial secret key for authentication, these protocols become key expansion rather than key distribution protocols. The investigation of whether the requirements for authentication can be lowered [15] , [16] , [17] , [25] , [26] led to the development of interactive authentication protocols, in which only partially secret and partially correlated strings suffice. In [25] , an interactive protocol for authentication is proposed that works even if the adversary knows a substantial fraction of the secret key. In [26] , it was shown that this interactive authentication protocol, combined with an information reconciliation protocol, can work even in the case when the randomness initially given to Alice and Bob is not perfectly but only partly correlated.
In this paper, we depart from the model of common randomness shared by Alice and Bob. The inspiration for this comes from the work of Wyner [33] on the wiretap channel and Csizar and Korner [7] on the broadcast channel with confidential messages. In these papers, it is shown that if the channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than the channel from Alice to Eve, suitable encoding and decoding exist which accomplish error correction and secrecy simultaneously: Bob can correctly decode Alice's message, but Eve remains ignorant of it. In the present paper, we ask whether a similar phenomenon is possible for authentication instead of secrecy, and we give an affirmative answer.
Another motivation for the present work is the study of authentication in the context of quantum key distribution. The results we prove in this paper, combined with the analysis of the composition of QKD and authentication [22] , [24] , show that QKD can be performed over insecure classical and quantum channels, between two parties who share no randomness initially, provided that the classical channel between them is less noisy than the channel between them and the adversary.
As far as the present author is aware, the idea of using an advantage in channel noise for composable, unconditionally secure message authentication has not been explored before. The closest that the present author has been able to find in the cryptography literature is [10] , which considers the problem of running a traditional, key-based authentication protocol over a wiretap channel. Also interesting are a number of methods for authentication used in physical layer security for wireless networks. These methods exploit unique characteristics of the software or hardware of different devices, or unique characteristics of the channel between two locations, to identify legitimate from malicious signals. An overview of these techniques can be found in the surveys [21, Section VIII-D] and [34] .
The multiple access channel from network information theory [6, Section 15.3] is also related to the present paper in that the multiple access channel has many senders and one receiver. However, all the senders and the receiver in the multiple access channel cooperate; they choose their encoding and decoding rules together so as to achieve certain rates of transmission from each sender to the receiver. In our setup, Alice and Bob cooperate, but Eve is malicious. She observes the encoding and decoding rules that Alice and Bob have agreed upon, and tries her best to fool Bob into accepting a message from her as if it is a genuine message from Alice.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we introduce Abstract Cryptography, the framework for composable security that we will use. In Section III we formally explain how an authenticated channel can be constructed from an advantage in channel noise, and we prove that the construction is composable and provides information theoretic security. In Section IV we discuss some extensions of the results from the previous section, and in Section V we conclude the paper and note some possible directions for future work.
II. ABSTRACT CRYPTOGRAPHY
The general case of Abstract Cryptography was introduced in [14] ; however, for our purposes, it is sufficient to consider the special case for honest Alice and Bob and malicious Eve as developed in [12] .
A. An algebra of resources and converters By a resource, we mean a system with three interfaces where Alice, Bob and Eve can enter inputs and receive outputs. We will denote resources by calligraphic letters, for example R. It will be convenient to specify the functionality of a resource by giving pseudo-code for it; for example, a channel from Alice to Bob that provides authentication but no secrecy can be described as "on input m from Alice, output m to Bob and Eve. On input m from Eve, output ⊥ to Bob." where we use ⊥ to denote an error message.
On the set of resources, we have a parallel composition operation, denoted by , which takes two resources and returns another resource. Thus, R S is a resource that provides Alice, Bob and Eve with access to the interfaces of both R and S.
By converter, we mean a system with an inside and an outside interface, where the inside interface interacts with a resource and the outside interface interacts with a user. If α is a converter, R is a resource and i ∈ {A, B, E} is an interface, then α i R is another resource, where user i has the interface of the converter α, and the other two users have their usual interfaces to R.
B. Distinguishers, distance, construction
By a distinguisher, we mean a system with four interfaces, three of which connect to the interfaces of a resource, and the fourth one outputs 0 or 1. Thus, a distinguisher D connected to a resource R is a system that outputs a single bit.
We use distinguishers to define a notion of distance between resources:
Definition 1: The distance between two resources R, S is
We take the supremum over all distinguishers D, placing no restriction on their computational resources. This corresponds to choosing to consider unconditional security (in another terminology information theoretic security).
From the definition, we can prove that d(·, ·) has the properties of a pseudo-metric on the set of resources:
Proposition 1: For all resources R, S, T
We can also prove that d has two additional useful properties, which formally capture the intuition "if R, S are close, then they remain close in an arbitrary context": Proposition 2: For all resources R, S, T , converters α and interfaces i ∈ {A, B, E} 1) (Non-increasing under a converter)
2) (Non-increasing under a resource in parallel)
To prove this proposition, observe that a subset of all distinguishers apply the converter α or add the resource T in parallel.
Before we can proceed to the definition of construction, we need to introduce protocols, filters, and simulators. By a protocol, we mean a pair of converters, one for Alice and one for Bob. By a filter, we mean a converter for Eve's interface of a resource which blocks malicious actions from Eve; we will use symbols such as , to denote the filters for different resources. By a simulator, we mean a converter for Eve's interface of a resource; the goal of a simulator is to make the interface of one resource appear as the interface of another. Now we are ready to define construction. Definition 2: We say that a protocol π = (π A , π B ) constructs resource S from resource R within , denoted R π, − − → S, if 1) ( -close with Eve blocked) d(π A π B E R, E S) < 2) ( -close with full access for Eve) There exists a simulator σ E such that d(π A π B R, σ E S) < . The typical interpretation of the definition of construction is the following: S is the goal, the ideal functionality that Alice and Bob want to achieve. R is the real resource that they have available. The combination of π and R is required to be indistinguishable from S in two scenarios: with Eve blocked and with Eve present.
Since Eve's interfaces to R and S may be different, we need to allow for the simulator σ in the second condition of the definition. If S is considered secure, then σ E S should be considered at least as secure; this is because a subset of all strategies for Eve against S apply the converter σ.
C. General composition theorem
The notion of construction provides both parallel and sequential composition, as captured in the following theorem This theorem captures formally the idea that if an ideal resource can be constructed from a real resource and a protocol, then the construction can safely be used instead of the ideal resource in an arbitrary context.
III. CONSTRUCTING AN AUTHENTICATED CHANNEL FROM AN ADVANTAGE IN CHANNEL NOISE
In this section, we show how Alice and Bob can use an advantage in channel noise to construct an authenticated channel.
First, we look at the goal: the ideal authenticated channel that Alice and Bob want to construct. The resource A n for transmitting n-bit authenticated messages from Alice to Bob is defined by the pseudo-code:
1) On input m ∈ {0, 1} n from Alice, output m to Bob and Eve.
2) On input m from Eve, output ⊥ to Bob. Thus, Bob gets the guarantee: if anything other than ⊥ is output by the channel, then it must have come from Alice.
Next, we look at the noisy channel that Alice and Bob have available. Let 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1/2 and consider the resource N n p,q defined by the pseudo-code:
n from Eve, draw V 1 , . . . , V n i.i.d. Bernoulli(q) random variables and output m + V = (m 1 + V 1 , . . . , m n + V n ) to Bob. Thus, n-bit messages from Alice go through a binary symmetric channel with parameter p, while n-bit messages from Eve go through a binary symmetric channel with parameter q.
To construct the ideal from the real resource, Alice and Bob use suitable encoding and decoding of messages. We will denote by E n Alice's encoding for transmission over N n p,q , and by D n Bob's corresponding decoding. Our main result is the following:
Theorem 2: Let 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 1/2. Then, for any r < h(q)−h(p), for any > 0 and for all sufficiently large n, there
To prove this theorem, we observe that there are two ways that the real system E n A D n B N n p,q can fail: 1) Alice sends a message to Bob, which he decodes incorrectly or rejects. We call this decoding error and denote the maximum probability of it occurring by p de . 2) Eve sends a message to Bob, which he accepts and decodes. We call this false acceptance and denote the maximum probability of it occurring by p f a Then, in the first part of the proof (subsection III-A), we show that there exist suitable encoding for Alice and decoding for Bob such that p de , p f a are both small. In the second part of the proof (subsection III-B), we show that if a real system has small probability of decoding error and of false acceptance, then this real system constructs the ideal system in the sense of Definition 2.
A. Good encoding and decoding exist
The encoding for Alice consists of selecting 2 rn codewords {c 1 , . . . , c 2 rn } ⊂ {0, 1}
n . The decoding for Bob will be typical sequence decoding: Bob will decode the set of output sequences c i + T (n, p, δ) to message i, where T (n, p, δ) denotes the set of all δ-typical sequences for n i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) random variables and where we choose δ < (h(q) − h(p) − r)/3.
Given r < h(q) − h(p) and > 0, the Noisy Channel Coding Theorem [6, Chapter 7] implies that for all sufficiently large n there is a codebook of 2 rn codewords achieving a maximum probability of decoding error at most . Now, we need to analyze the probability that Bob accepts a message coming form Eve. The set of channel outputs that Bob accepts is
What is the probability that Eve's message is corrupted to an output in this set? Suppose Eve inputs z into the channel, resulting in output
Both of these terms go to zero as n goes to infinity. Thus, for all sufficiently large n the probability of false acceptance will be below .
B. Construction in the sense of Abstract Cryptography.
There is a general idea in cryptography: if two systems behave the same unless some event E occurs, then the distinguishing advantage between them is at most P r(E). This idea has been formalized by several authors; see, for example, [11] , [3] , [27] , [13] . Now, consider the real and ideal resources with Eve blocked. The real resource E n A D n B E N n p,q behaves identically to the ideal resource E A rn as long as a decoding error does not occur. Therefore,
Next, consider the real and ideal resources with full access for Eve. We have to choose a simulator; we see that a suitable choice is σ given by the pseudo-code: "On input x at the inside interface, output c x at the outside interface. On input z at the outside interface, output rn zeros at the inside interface."
Now, we have to evaluate
The real resource behaves identically to the ideal resource as long as no decoding error or false acceptance occurs. Therefore,
Combining all observations so far, we complete the proof of Theorem 2.
IV. EXTENSIONS
In this section we consider some extensions of the results of the previous section. First, we consider an extension to more general models of a noisy channel.
Let X, Y, Z be finite alphabets for Alice's input, Bob's output and Eve's input respectively. Let P (·|·) and Q(·|·) be two sets of conditional probabilities and consider the real resource N n P,Q for transmitting n-symbol words given by the pseudo-code: Thus, Alice's messages pass through a discrete memoryless channel with transition probabilities P and Eve's messages pass through a discrete memoryless channel with transition probabilities Q.
Using essentially the same argument as the proof of Theorem 2 in Section III we obtain:
Theorem 3: For every
(1) for every > 0 and for all sufficiently large n, there exists a protocol
− −− → A rn . Due to space limitations, we refer the reader to the full version of the paper for details.
A natural question is whether one can prove a converse result. We give an example showing that a converse to Theorem 3 does not hold; the present author does not know whether a converse to Theorem 2 holds.
Let the alphabet for Alice be {0, 1}, the alphabet for Bob be {0, 1, 2, 3}, and the alphabet for Eve be {0, 1}. Let the transition probabilities from Alice to Bob be
all other probabilities being zero. Thus, the channel from Alice to Bob is a binary symmetric channel with parameter p, that only uses the first two symbols of Bob's alphabet. Let the transition probabilities from Eve to Bob be
all other probabilities being zero. Thus, the channel from Eve to Bob is a perfect binary channel that uses only the second two symbols of Bob's alphabet. Then, the upper bound from equation (1) is −h(p) < 0. Nevertheless, it is clear that Alice and Bob can transmit at any rate up to the capacity 1−h(p) of the binary symmetric channel between them and can achieve both authentication and error correction.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown that if the channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than the channel from Eve to Bob, then Alice and Bob can accomplish error correction and message authentication simultaneously. The intuition behind the result is that for long sequences, there is a subset S of the channel outputs for Bob such that S is large when measured by the probability that a codeword from Alice is corrupted into it, and S is also small when measured by the probability that any input from Eve is corrupted into it.
To ensure seamless integration of the authentication scheme proposed here with other cryptographic protocols, we have proved it provides composable, information theoretic security using the Abstract Cryptography framework. Note also that error correcting codes with efficient encoding and decoding can be used, as long as the set S of outputs that Bob accepts is small from the point of view of Eve.
The present paper raises a number of interesting questions that can be the subject of future work; we list some of them here. First, what is the set of all rates r such that Alice and Bob can transmit information at rate r bits per channel use and achieve both error correction and authentication? In the present paper, we have shown that rates up to a certain bound are always achievable, but have also given an example where a rate higher than the bound is possible. Thus, the complete characterization of the achievable rates is still not known. Second, would allowing two way communication and interaction between Alice and Bob give further possibilities, as was the case for secrecy in the wiretap channel [18] , and for authentication in the shared randomness model [25] , [26] ? Third, is it possible to combine the coding for the broadcast channel and for the authentication channel to achieve error correction, authentication and secrecy simultaneously?
